Sudan is living through one of the darkest moments in its modern history. Since April 2023, the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has devastated entire cities, displaced millions, and pushed the population toward famine. What began as a struggle between two military factions has turned into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe, with workers and ordinary people paying the price while the rival generals and their foreign backers fight for power and wealth.
This conflict is deeply rooted in decades of authoritarianism, militarization, economic collapse, and foreign interference. At the same time, Sudan is located at a strategic crossroads linking East Africa, the Sahel and the Red Sea—regions heavily affected by intense geopolitical rivalry. The war is also shaped by these wider pressures.
Key facts
Sudan, the third-largest country in Africa after Algeria and the DRC, has a population of roughly 45 million, most of them young. Arabic is the main language and Islam the dominant religion. Since independence in 1956, the country has been repeatedly torn by coups and civil wars driven by competing elites.
Since the outbreak of civil war in 2023, almost 12 million people have been forced to flee their homes—either within Sudan or to neighbouring countries—creating one of the largest displacement crises in recent decades. Around 25 million people now face severe food insecurity, according to UN estimates. A Le Monde investigation published in November 2024 suggests that more than 150,000 civilians may have already died as a result of bombardments, massacres, hunger and disease- the number today, after a year, is bound to be much higher. The UN has characterised it “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”.
Roots of the Crisis
Sudan’s current disaster flows directly from the unresolved contradictions of the 2019 revolution. Back then, millions mobilized to bring down Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year dictatorship, with workers, professionals and neighborhood committees at the heart of the movement. But the transitional process was sabotaged from within. The military and security elites—who had built vast political and economic empires under Bashir—refused to surrender their power. Unfortunately, there was no political power to contest this.
Both the SAF and the RSF emerged from this system. The SAF controls major sectors of the formal economy, from banking to agriculture and real estate. The RSF, evolving from the Janjaweed militias (who were involved in the Darfur ‘03-’05 genocide), built its wealth on gold mining, border control, and smuggling networks. Backed by competing regional powers, the two forces eventually turned their rivalry into open war.
The 2019 revolution opened up the process of establishing civilian rule in Sudan. But the military and security elites that dominated the economy under Bashir never relinquished their power. The transitional government was structurally undermined from the start: generals controlled key ministries, armed units maintained separate chains of command, and the economic empire of the army and the RSF remained untouched.
International actors contributed to this failure. While speaking the language of “democratic transition,” the US, EU and regional powers were basically interested in counterterrorism, migration control and access to Sudan’s resources. In practice, this meant tolerating—or directly supporting—the same military elites who later plunged the country into a devastating war.
By April 2023, tensions between the two dominant armed blocs erupted into open conflict. The SAF, rooted in the old state apparatus, and the RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, turned Sudan’s towns and cities into battlefields.
The Proxy Dimension
Regional powers have fuelled the conflict. Egypt views the SAF as a reliable ally against instability in the Nile Basin and Ethiopia’s growing influence, and its military establishment maintains deep connections with SAF commanders.
At the same time, numerous reports point to the United Arab Emirates’ support for the RSF. For Abu Dhabi, the RSF represents a transactional partner aligned with its economic ambitions along the Red Sea.
Sudan’s war reflects not only internal or regional rivalries but also the global competition for resources, trade routes and strategic influence.
Russia, through the Wagner Group network and its successors, has long been tied to RSF-linked gold extraction and has sought naval access to Port Sudan—a move that would significantly shift Red Sea power dynamics. China, Sudan’s largest trading partner, and the US have not taken sides, and repeat the mantra of stability, not wanting to lose links with any side, in essence waiting for the victor in order to establish relations. In the meantime, the disaster continues…
War and Wealth
At the heart of the conflict lies competition for economic power between the two military factions. The RSF’s control over gold mines gives it access to foreign currency and global smuggling networks, often linked to markets in the UAE, Chad and Libya. The SAF, meanwhile, dominates state revenue systems, import channels and major agricultural assets. In essence, armed groups act as profit-seeking enterprises, enriching warlords while destroying the lives of ordinary people.
The US now is engaged in diplomatic moves to enforce one of Trump’s “peace plans”. It has tried to mobilise the Quad (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, AUE and the USA), USs’ closest allies in the region after Israel. This attempt seems extremely fragile at the moment. While the RSF declared a “unilateral ceasefire”, army chief and Sovereign Council head Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF has characterised the peace plan “the worst paper” and battles are still ongoing.
In any case, Trump wants to implement a deal for a peace and a transition to civilian rule that will solidify US interests in the country and will not solve any of the underlying problems. Similar patterns have unfolded in Libya, the Central African Republic and elsewhere, where imperialist powers attempt to reshape transitions to their own benefit.
Transition?
For decades, Washington labelled Sudan a “rogue state” under Omar al-Bashir, due to its ties with China, Russia and North Korea. This justified sanctions and diplomatic isolation—not out of concern for democracy, but because Sudan’s orientation conflicted with US geopolitical interests in the region.
Sections of the civilian leadership that emerged after the 2019 revolution adopted a pro-market, neoliberal agenda aligned with Western institutions. Instead of challenging the power of the military and security elites, these forces were interested in reintegration into the global capitalist system and opened the door to IMF-style reforms. The demands of the revolt—bread, freedom, social justice—were pushed aside by a liberal wing that acted as an intermediary layer between imperialist interests and the Sudanese ruling class.
Bashir represented a corrupt and brutal authoritarian regime under the banner of political Islam, and attempted at times to manoeuvre between rival imperialist blocs. The regime that followed did not fundamentally challenge Sudan’s dependent, capitalist structure—they simply tried to reorient it. But since they could not pave a way forward for the masses, the regime collapsed from the inside.
Catastrophe and Solidarity
Workers are at the heart of this catastrophe. Public-sector employees face months without salaries as inflation explodes. Agricultural labourers and pastoral communities confront destroyed farmlands, disrupted planting cycles and blocked migration routes—threats that deepen food insecurity across East Africa. Health workers operate in besieged hospitals with almost no supplies, electricity or pay. Informal workers, a huge part of Sudan’s labour force, have lost access to markets and basic income.
Despite the dangers, trade unions, professional associations and grassroots committees—central forces in the 2019 uprising—continue to function underground. Their endurance demonstrates the resilience and political potential of organised labour even under extreme conditions. The resistance committees, that played an important role in organising civil disobedience against the Bashir regime and then in the 2019 revolt, are still active spreading anti-war slogans and organising medical supplies.
Workers organisations worldwide should talk about the suffering of the Sudanese people, discuss ways to stop arms shipments to the warring parties and demand from their government to stop supporting any side.
International workers’ solidarity is not charity—it is a strategic intervention. Standing with Sudanese workers means strengthening the forces fighting for peace, accountability and a democratic transformation rooted in social justice. Putting forward the need for a socialist transformation of society, as the only road to end the horrors of capitalism, can play an important role in shaping consciousness in the region and worldwide.
