History/Theory

4th ISp Conference: On tactics

Internationalist Standpoint
By Internationalist Standpoint

The 4th annual Conference of Internationalist Standpoint (ISp) took place between the 18th and 22nd of April. The main discussions were based on three documents:


  • World Perspectives update 

  • On Tactics 

  • Marxism and the National Question 


Other discussions included:

  • The building and the development of ISp’s work internationally,

special sessions on:

  • Iran
  • Brazil
  • United States

and special reports on our work in:

  • Romania
  • Taiwan
  • Nigeria

The resolution on the “World Perspectives update” (read here) and the document “On Tactics” were amended in the course of the preconference discussion, agreed and voted on in the course of the conference. The document on the National Question will continue to be amended, based on the discussion before and at the conference and will be completed and voted on by a special online meeting of the delegates to the 4th Conference.

Read below the resolution on “On Tactics”.

The document on “The National Question” will follow at a later stage.

Intro

  1. The creation of Your Party (YP) in the UK and the new rise of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) in the US, in the past few months, has reinvigorated the discussion on tactics for our comrades in the respective countries. Not only ISp but also many other organisations of the anticapitalist Left are now involved in the work for building these two formations, aiming to give them a more radical and anticapitalist direction (and to also strengthen their presence internally).
  2.  This makes a re-discussion of Entryism important –not just for the UK and the US– as part of a wider discussion about how to approach and/or work inside the New Left Formations (NLF) that have been a constant feature of political developments over the past three decades (since the capitalist restoration in the ex-Stalinist states and the degeneration of the traditional parties of the Left – Social-democratic and “communist”).
  3. The present document is not a document on Entryism and it certainly does not aim at applying entryism as a universal tactic for ISp. Reading through the document will clarify that this is not the case; on the contrary the substance of it is to show the huge flexibility that is demanded for tactics, that there is a multiplicity of tactics to be applied depending on circumstances, on the country and the time. There is no universal tactic that is correct everywhere and at all times except, of some general tactical methods, like the United Front, the application of which, again, will differ, depending on time and place. Entryism, however, takes a lot of space in the current document, because although it applies only to a minority of cases, it is important to describe, to look at the opportunities and dangers it entails, and to study its history so as to learn from it.
  4. Tactics are of decisive importance. A correct analysis and a correct political-transitional programme are not enough. A key feature of revolutionary tactics is the United Front (UF) – this is absolutely crucial. Without this, any organisation that refers to Marxism and revolutionary socialism is doomed. As Lenin and Trotsky explained, without the UF tactic the October revolution would not have been possible. The UF was a key feature of the 3rd International as was elaborately developed in the 3rd and 4th congress. The UF tactic was abandoned by Stalinism, very soon after Lenin’s death. 
  5. In its classical sense the UF, the full name of which is “the tactic of the united workers’ front” (i.e. it excludes bourgeois forces), means the need to call for the maximum unity of the working class in its struggles, defensive or offensive. In the interwar period (1920s and 1930s) its practical implication was the unity in action, essentially (but not only), between the workers following communist organisations and those following social-democratic organizations. In theory the UF could vary from unity in action on “single” issues to what Trotsky described as its highest form, the soviets.  
  6. In the present epoch, when the traditional working-class parties (whether “social-democratic” or “communist”) have largely lost their links to the working class, the application of the tactic of the UF cannot have the same practical applications as in the past. Even the call for a UF based on the forces of the trade unions is again not as simple as in the past, because the traditional structures of the trade unions, in quite a number of countries (certainly not everywhere), are questioned by millions of workers – also trade union organisation is at post WWII low levels, around 10% of the workforce. However, the substance of the tactic of the UF remains unchanged: revolutionaries have to call for the maximum unity of the working class, irrespective of ideological or political preferences, i.e., revolutionaries must aim at common action with workers affiliated to reformist (or Stalinist, or anarcho-syndicalist) currents. In some cases, the forces to which the appeal can be directed are small or much smaller than in the past. In such cases we could use the expression “method of the united front” or “united front approach” so as not to confuse it with its classical meaning, i.e., the appeal to the mass forces of the working class.
  7. The tactics (or methodology) of the United Front, beyond strengthening the mass movement and the contact of Marxists with broader layers of workers who support reformist formations, also aims to reveal the limits of the reformists, who are certain to abandon the struggle in the middle of the road, undermining or limiting the potential and perspectives of the mass movement. The working-class masses will not reject reformism through ideological discussions but through their experience, when they see that it ultimately subordinates itself to the ruling class. Of course, in order to draw full socialist-revolutionary conclusions, this experience alone is not enough; the active role of Marxists is necessary, through their participation in the mass movement, explanation, the correct transitional program and critique of reformism within the framework of the tactics of the UF.
  8. There is a huge subjective problem in the Anticapitalist Left, globally. It’s not an accident that in an epoch of a deep and generalized crisis of capitalism, the Left in general and the anticapitalist one in particular are in deep crisis. The crisis is all engulfing: political, tactical and organisational. At the same time, we must note that the anti-capitalist/Marxist Left has significant potential to gain influence and support (social and electoral) as shown by a series of examples (e.g. Argentina, Ireland, Greece, etc.) developed in our document “The Decline of Europe and the Crisis of the Left” of the 3rd ISp Conference.
  9. We distinguish between the “anticapitalist” and the “revolutionary” Left or Marxism, in the sense that “anticapitalism” is a broader concept that includes many groups and currents that want to fight capitalism in an abstract way, without the scientific understanding of capitalism as a mode of production. Without this understanding they do not have a clear strategy, tactics and organisational structures, to that end.
  10. Tragically, in the anticapitalist Left internationally there are very strong sectarian traditions – linked to a large extent to the fact that most of these groups have limited links with the working class and “live” on the fringes of society and the mass movements. On the other hand, we have anticapitalist organisations that end up in opportunism, by “broadening” the meaning of the UF to include parties of the establishment and taking part in “progressive governments” (as is the case, recently, for example, with PSOL in Brazil) or liquidating themselves into broader reformist formations, looking for shortcuts or in order to be on good terms with the bureaucracy inside these formations.
  11. There is a variety of tactical options in the present epoch. Entryism, where applicable, would not have the same characteristics as it had in the 1930s or in the post WWII decades. In many (but not all) of the NLFs today, it’s possible to join without having to make organisational or political concessions – i.e., an organisation can join and continue to act independently. There are various other tactical options that can be seen as belonging to a large spectrum, ranging from entryism to different applications of the united front method. These depend on the relative weight of an organisation, on its ability to play a significant role in building a new political formation together with other forces. This is obviously related to the size and, more generally, to its (stronger or weaker) position in the working class and the mass movements. In such a case what we have is the attempt by Marxists to build a new political formation, in which they can play a role from the beginning, together with other Marxist or anticapitalist organisations which have a similar weight or size. This would be different from small or even sizeable Marxist organisations joining new formations in which there is a major (reformist) force that dominates – as for example in the case of SYRIZA, Podemos, Die Linke, etc. 
  12. In the case of a number of anticapitalist groups coming together to build some kind of a new left party, care has to be taken not to fall into the trap of sectarianism. We can work with other groups in this direction on the strict condition that they are oriented to the mass of the working class and are able to “speak in their language” – i.e. use the transitional method to build revolutionary consciousness. We should keep a clear distance from groups dominated by petit bourgeois intellectualistic circles, which will as a general rule end up in sectarianism or opportunism (as well as groups that have anarchistic inclinations). If such groups have a sizable presence, under certain conditions we can have a UF approach to them, i.e. work with them in common campaigns and have a general collaboration, but not aim to build a common political venture together.
  13. On the other hand, being part of a broader, bigger (reformist) formation has the advantage of “protecting” Marxists against sectarianism, training them in a better understanding of working-class consciousness and more effectively developing their transitional programme. But there are dangers here as well: the main one is that of an opportunist adaptation, i.e. making too many political concessions under the pressure of the bureaucracy, having the illusion that the party as a whole can be transformed by the Marxists, making organisational concessions in the direction of, at least, partial liquidation, etc.
  14. In other words, there are no blueprints, there is not one recipe to be applied in all conditions. Our work in different countries has to start from the understanding that tactics need to be, by definition, flexible and that the conditions in each and every country will be different. The experience of comrades internationally, of course, will be crucial in better understanding our options in different countries. And, sometimes, some experimentation may be necessary before we arrive at final conclusions.
  15. With these general ideas in mind we approach, in the next pages, entryism and other tactical options, both from a historical point of view and from present day experiences by our organisations – thus, aim to draw lessons for our work in different countries now and in the future.

Part I

Α historical background to “Entryism” – 1930s

  1. The question of tactics has always been of decisive importance. There are very rich lessons from the past. A crucial aspect of tactics is to avoid isolation from the masses. This means that when the masses are seeking a way forward through new (political) vehicles small or large, we have to pay careful attention. And we have to consider carefully what our approach should be to reach the best layers, to reach the vanguard but also the wider class, who are looking towards these political formations.
  2. This discussion goes back to the Communist Manifesto. One of the questions raised was: “in what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians (the working class) as a whole?”. The answer given was: “the Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working-class parties”. It was a clear statement in 1848, where Marx and Engels warned against the dangers of separation, of isolation, of raising the banner on a distant “mountaintop”. Essentially, they were arguing for revolutionaries to be involved with the working class in their daily struggles and in the mass organisations of the working class.
  3. “Entryism” as a tactic only came to the fore in the 1930s. Prior to the 1930s Marxists had firstly worked within the mass organisations of the late 19th century, the 2nd International of Social Democratic (SD) parties, which formally adhered to Marxism. 
  4. The Bolsheviks, after October 1917, raised the banner of the Communist (3rd) International and called for the separation of the Communist Parties (CP) out of the Social Democratic parties. In the revolutionary events that followed October 1917, they worked consciously for the splitting of the SD parties in order to form new (communist) parties; but at the same time, in Britain for example, Lenin argued for the small CP to orientate to the Labour Party (LP), to seek membership of LP and to be part of the labour movement. The British LP, at that time, had a federal character so it was possible for groupings to be affiliated to it; but nevertheless, it was a clear statement from Lenin, that the spirit laid out by the Communist Manifesto still held, that separation and isolation was not the place for revolutionaries.
  5. The question of Entryism came onto the agenda in the 1930s as a by-product of the weakness of the revolutionary forces of Trotskyism. After the victory of Stalinism in the Soviet Union the Left Opposition was established, which then took on an international character and became the International Left Opposition – and eventually the embryonic 4th International. By the mid-1930s, while the forces of Marxism-Trotskyism everywhere were very weak, we had in many countries a revolutionary or a pre-revolutionary situation. So, Trotsky advised his followers to become involved in the mass SD parties in order to reach the vanguard of the workers, to develop and crystallise revolutionary forces as quickly as possible. It was a tactic for a period where the opportunities were huge and the organised revolutionary forces were very small.
  6. The first place where Trotsky gave the concrete advice for his followers to enter a mass formation was in Britain. The Independent Labour Party (ILP) had been the original workers’ party – that is the workers’ party before the creation of the LP. When the LP was formed in 1903, the ILP became one of his constituent components. By the early 1930s the ILP was to the left of the mainstream leadership of the LP and it split from the party. It was a very fluid situation, the ILP was losing members quickly, workers were confused, some looked to the Communist Party, some still looked to the Labour Party, but most of them could see no party which represented their interests. The point Trotsky made was that there were about 40 comrades in Britain at the time, but the ILP had 10-11,000 members (on paper). So, if the 40 comrades could do productive political work in the ILP and emerge from it strengthened, with double, or treble or ten times the membership, that would be a huge step forward.
  7. However, Trotsky did not advocate entryism in the 1930s, in all circumstances. He advocated it when certain conditions applied. These conditions can be summarised, as follows:
    • there should be a pre-revolutionary or revolutionary situation in society,
    • a ferment within Social Democracy (or within the reformist or the centrist party) with a political struggle inside,
    • the development/crystallization of a left-wing within the party to which the revolutionary forces could orientate,
    • and the possibility of the rapid crystallisation of a revolutionary wing/tendency within the party.

Trotsky’s proposal caused a split in the small British group. Some of his supporters applied the tactic and others didn’t.

  1. Soon afterwards, he proposed the same approach in France, which became known as the French Turn, and advocated entry into the SFIO (the French Socialist Party, affiliated to the 2nd International). His proposal led to debates in the French group, which also split.
  2. He also advised the same tactic to the very small forces of Trotskyism in Spain in the period leading up to the Spanish Civil War. The youth wing of PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party) approached the Trotskyists saying: you have the best ideas, we need you to join with us in order to understand what is happening and to point the way forward. Trotsky proposed to his comrades to join PSOE but they did not follow his advice. And the rudderless youth wing of the Socialist Party instead ended up in the orbit of Stalinism and gave Stalinism a base in Spain that it had not possessed up to that point. And of course, the Stalinists became the gravediggers of the revolution in Spain. A historic opportunity was lost.
  3. The tactic was clear in Trotsky’s view, but it was mostly misapplied by the very young forces of Trotskyism at the time, though there were exceptions, especially in the United States of America. There the group around James Cannon applied the tactic more flexibly and in a more thorough-going fashion, and were able to emerge from the Socialist Party with strengthened forces.
  4. These tactics can be considered as “classical entryism” – applied in a pre-revolutionary or revolutionary situation. That context has largely not existed since the 1930s. Instead, after World War II, a new period opened up. A new era which had not been predicted by Trotsky. The capitalist class was able to stabilise its system, partly through the destruction of war and then the development of the productive forces in a long post war upswing that lasted for around 25 years. Stalinism was able to consolidate its rule not just in the Soviet Union but across Eastern Europe; and the SD parties were able to restabilise their hold over the working class, in part because the ruling class had to lean on the SD parties in order to restabilise their system.

Entryism in the post war decades

  1. In the post war period Trotskyism as a current was in search of a direction. The strengthening of both Stalinism and Social Democracy internationally led them to isolation. A number of Trotskyist currents applied the tactic of Entryism in different countries. In Britain it was applied in a consistent way and on a long-term basis by a group around Ted Grant, after the crisis and collapse of the Revolutionary Communist Party to which they belonged.
  2. Ted Grant and his group, forerunners of what was to become the CWI (Committee for a Workers’ International), understood that capitalism had entered a long upswing, but also that another major economic crisis was inevitable. They understood that for a period of time theTrotskyist forces would be relatively isolated, and they argued that the best way forward in that context was to do patient, long-term entry work.
  3. This approach was different from the approach of Michel Pablo and the “Fourth International” at the time (Pablo served as General Secretary of the F.I. from 1948 to 1960) who argued for “entryism sui generis” (entryism of a special type). By this they meant that the Trotskyist forces should go into the SD parties and into the Communist Parties, but instead of having an open banner they argued for what can be described as “deep entryism”, which in practice meant to “bury” themselves and “hide” so as to be invisible to the bureaucracy. This was based on mistaken perspectives, of imminent revolutions, of crisis and of war, including a nuclear war. Other Trotskyist currents, eg around Gerry Healy in Britain and Pierre Lambert in France applied variations of the entryist tactic but none had the successes that Ted Grant’s group had.
  4. The conception of entryism by the group around Ted Grant was that of a long-term orientation to the mass organisations, always with an open banner – the Militant paper in Britain played this role. That doesn’t mean that all of the work took place within the SD parties. Much of the work was done through the youth wings of the SD parties, essentially as open work. The majority of recruits came through this kind of independent work. Partly through the contacts with other youth wings of SD parties internationally, the group in Britain was gradually able to establish an international organisation, the CWI.
  5. During the post war decades, in certain countries, especially in Britain, Trotskyism scored outstanding successes. In the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Militant Tendency in Britain grew from less than 50 to several 1000 and then in the mid-1980s, to 8,000 members. Militant was able to win the leadership of the Liverpool City Council and lead a historical battle against Thatcher – which was defeated. Soon afterwards it initiated the Poll Tax movement, which was victorious in the end and brought Thatcher down. Three Militant members were elected to parliament and over 30 were elected councillors at a certain point.
  6. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the CWI was able to accumulate forces in many countries, primarily basing itself on similar tactics to the ones followed in Britain.
  7. There were dangers in the application of long-term entryism, of course – these have to be always born in mind. The routine of being part of a mass workers’ party, particularly one that is moving in a right-ward direction, can become a substitute for revolutionary work for a section of the membership, especially if they have been around for 10, 20, 30 or more years. This can blunt the edge of what is required for a revolutionary party to develop. By the late 1980s, routinism was very much a factor and played a key role in the 1992 split away from the CWI by Grant and his supporters.
  8. By then the Militant Tendency in Britain had become so large it was it was impossible to maintain the figment that there wasn’t a revolutionary party within the Labour Party. The LP bureaucracy, with the support of the ruling class, decided that they had to get rid of Militant. The work that was done through the Poll Tax was entirely outside the Labour Party and clashed with the interests of the LP. Long term entryism was coming to its end – it was no longer a fruitful arena of work.
  9. In other countries the entryist tactic never acquired the kind of long-term character it had in Britain. PASOK in Greece, the SD in Sweden, the Labour Party in Northern Ireland, etc, expelled the CWI groups very quickly. In such cases the entryist tactic was replaced with independent work but with orientation (putting demands on, collaborating where possible, voting for), at the same time, towards the mass parties of the working class. At a later stage, in the 1990s, this “tactic of orientation” was replaced with campaigns for the building of new workers’ parties.
  10. The 1990s were different from all previous post WWII decades – capitalism was strengthened by the collapse of Stalinism, the SD parties moved decisively to the right, while most of the Communist parties collapsed. This created a different context for the work of revolutionaries. The tactic of long term entryism was no longer applicable. New left formations were coming to the fore, and new tactics had to be developed. Independent work, independent campaigns but also broad formations, of a “front-like” character, using the method of the united front, had to be employed. Concrete tactics of working together or contributing to the building of new formations, where it was applicable, also had to be discussed. Entryism of a different kind, different from the 1930s and different from the long term entryism of the post war decades, was adopted in different countries and by different Trotskyist currents or organisations – such as in Italy or in Brazil. As a general rule, the New Left parties that sprung up since the early 1990s allow for much greater freedom of tendencies and even organisations to co-exist in the framework of the common party, which has strong characteristics of an alliance of different forces. The element of secrecy is not necessary in general, contrary to what characterized the work in major parties in the 1930s or in the post war decades.

Part II

  1. Entryism is a concept that is quite misunderstood and negatively charged within the ranks of the Left. In practice it means the presence of Marxist/revolutionary socialist currents within broader left-wing formations. Precisely because the presence of Marxists in broader or mass workers’/left parties exposes the leadership/bureaucracy of these parties due to the political inadequacy of reformism, entryism has been attacked as something “conspiratorial”, “divisive”, even “immoral”, etc. Something similar applies to the word “faction” or “factional”. Historically and until the Stalinization of the Communist International, the existence of factions in mass left parties –with the Bolsheviks being a typical example– was something normal. With the imposition of Stalinism on the 3rd International, the existence of factions was banned with a stick and the accusation of factionalism became enough to attract harsh punishments, expulsions and even physical violence.
  2. As explained above, the term “entryism” first appeared in the 1930s and had as one of its characteristics the short duration. This was related to the speed of developments at the time, where “revolution and counter-revolution” had the character of an immediate perspective – with sharp turns and sudden changes and their reflection in the parties of the Left causing great internal conflicts, splits and regroupments. Trotsky’s writings of this period on this subject are of exceptional value. The next phase when entryism became relevant again was in the decades after World War II, implemented mainly by the CWI, with long-term characteristics, lasting until the late 1980s and early 1990s. At this time, in addition to the reformist Left denouncing the “intruders” as enemies of the movement, the CWI came also under attack from most organizations of the anti-capitalist Left, which, having slipped into sectarianism, denounced the CWI for “opportunism”. It is worth noting that the CWI developed entryist work, not only in SD but also in communist parties as well as in popular/democratic movements in “Third World” countries, that were facing authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships.
  3. In reality, the presence of Marxists within broader left/working class formations is not reprehensible, on the contrary, it signals the fact that Marxism as a current is by definition an organic element of the working class – and being present in its organisations is an element of democracy within the labor movement. This perception changed due to the traditions developed by Stalinism. As raised in “part I”, above, it is an element in the tradition of revolutionary/scientific socialism, starting from the time of Marx himself, for whom, as he wrote in the Communist Manifesto, the Communists do not constitute something that stands outside the mass labor movement and its organizations it. Certainly, since then, conditions have changed and today we need to emphasize the need to build a mass revolutionary, Marxist party. However, the substance of Marx’s statement remains true. It is also worth noting the historical experience of the Bolshevik party. Bolsheviks means “Majority”, which was formed (as opposed to the Mensheviks – “Minority”) in the process of the split of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903. The Bolsheviks led by Lenin did not abandon this name (“Majority of the RSDLP”) until 15 years later, after the victory of the October Revolution and their renaming to the Communist Party.
  4. It is also a fact that the presence of different currents within a political formation/party is something not at all unusual in politics in general and not something that concerns exclusively Marxists. For example, the parties of the Comintern, after their Stalinification, in various cases and times sent part of their forces to other, much larger formations in order to influence their course and development – ​​a classic example is the entry of the youth of the Spanish Communist Party into the youth of the Spanish Socialist Party during the Spanish Civil War. Or, they proceeded to create mass formations which they controlled behind the scenes or semi-openly – as for example in Greece with EAM, in South Africa with the African National Congress, etc. However, we should note that we also have similar phenomena in bourgeois parties. The extreme right wings that exist in the parties of the Right, in our time, were generally created by groups that entered these parties in previous times, waiting for conditions to mature in their favour.
  5. Based on the above it is important, to start with, to remove the metaphysical dimension from “entryism” and the impression that it is something outside the traditions of Marxism and the healthy traditions of the working class and mass movement.

Confirmed historically

  1. It is necessary to draw a balance sheet of the course of the CWI based on the main tactic that characterized it for a whole historical period. The balance sheet is clearly positive, despite the attacks against it in almost all the countries where it acted as a tendency within other labor parties and despite the easy criticism by various sectarian organizations about alleged opportunism.
  2. Entryism as such has nothing to do with opportunism. However, how one applies it can lead to opportunism. This happens when one waters down the revolutionary program or abandons one’s own organizational structure (“liquidationism”). In other words, entryism, like any other tactic, contains opportunities/potentialities as well as dangers.
  3. Based on the entryism tactic, the British CWI, within a period of 20-25 years, from a handful, reached 8,000 members, with elected representatives in parliament and in many local councils. It was able to lead huge mass movements, such as the Poll Tax and the Battle of Liverpool; and it made a major contribution to historic struggles such as the miners’ strike of 1985 (Militant had reached 500 members in the miners).
  4. The same tactic played a decisive role in the expansion of the CWI into new countries, bringing it into contact with left-wing movements and currents that were emerging or developing internationally within reformist parties in the 1970s. Over a period of about half a century, the CWI, developed into the most important (in terms of weight and cohesion) international Trotskyist organization – until its fragmentation and dissolution after 2018, when the leadership reached a point where it could not cope with the demands of a new period and chose to split (see, for example, here and here).
  5. The successes of the CWI do not mean that the CWI’s entryist tactic was the only correct tactic to be applied by Marxists – this is a different matter. In the same historical post-war period, we also saw the development of other international organizations that did not rely on the tactics of entryism, or that followed a combination of tactical options. Such examples are the IST (around the British SWP) or the organizations built through the contribution of Nahuel Moreno in Argentina and Latin America. The USFI (United Secretariat of the Fourth International, with E. Mandel being its best-known figure) on the other hand which is the largest Trotskyist organisation numerically, has followed a variety of tactics, including entryism, but mostly on an opportunist basis (the fact is, the USFI can hardly be called a “revolutionary organisation”).
  6. Entryism is “simply” a tactic – and there is no tactic that has the weight of a principle. There are good, better or bad tactics, but it is not the choice of tactics that determines whether an organization is sectarian or opportunist. This is determined by the way in which such tactical choices are implemented. Generally speaking, there is no single correct tactic in any historical period or country. There may be several “correct” tactics – that is, different tactics that can bring positive results in building the forces of Marxism.
  7. This is important to emphasize as too often splits over tactical issues occur, which are not justified historically. One such example is the 1992 split in the CWI when a section of it (the present IMT) considered that the CWI’s gradual shift away from entryism was an issue of principle, amounting to the abandonment of the working class.
  8. One of the important positives of the tactic of entryism is that it trains the members and cadres of the revolutionary organization in their contact with mass layers within the working-class movement and with the consciousness of the broad popular layers. This is key, in turn, for the precise formulation of the transitional demands. On the other hand, one of its “weaknesses” is that it adapts the less capable and weaker revolutionary elements of the party to the “safety” and “routine” of the large mass party that surrounds them – a form of conservatism. As a result, when the time comes to abandon entryism and to follow a different tactic, one part cannot follow – resulting in splits. Generally speaking, every significant shift in tactics usually causes smaller or larger splits, something that depends also on many other factors, among which is the handling of these changes internally (which is related to the internal regime and democracy).

New conditions, different tactics

  1. The differences between the entryism of the 1930s and the post-world-war II period are major, reflecting completely different objective conditions. Similarly, the different conditions of the period we are going through today, inevitably mean very different tactics – any mechanical, formal copying of the old methods and tactics will be doomed to failure.
  2. Today, as throughout the past century, Marxists have a duty to follow the tactics of the United (Workers’) Front, which translates into the need to call on working class political, trade union, social and other organisations, to fight together despite political or ideological differences. It goes without saying that Marxists have a duty to be part of such common initiatives/struggles, irrespective of the size of their forces. Of course, how the tactic, approach or method of the UF is applied, is something that can vary widely, depending on different objective conditions.
  3. After the collapse of Stalinism and the capitalist restoration in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the period 1990-91, the then SD and CP either collapsed or moved drastically to the right, creating a huge political vacuum in the Left. In these conditions, the involvement of Marxists in building new Left formations was necessary to fill this void.
  4. These new formations, objectively, would tend to be of a reformist character. This does not mean that Marxists undertake the role of building reformist parties themselves as a strategic pursuit. That would be equal to an abandonment of Marxism; the historical role of Marxists is always to build revolutionary parties. But this does not contradict the attempt to build mass organizations of struggle of the workers’ movement – ​​the trade unions, for example, are a clear case of this, but political formations are also necessary where they don’t exist. Thus, it is correct for Marxists, while maintaining their independence, to contribute to the building of mass workers’ organizations, while fighting at the same time for the adoption of a socialist-revolutionary-transitional program (by these mass organisations). The class balance of forces in the period after the collapse of Stalinism, however, was such that as a general rule it was unrealistic to expect that any such new, mass or semi-mass formation of the Left could have revolutionary characteristics. This combination of building both the Marxist organization and broad parties and fighting organizations of the movement, is what has been described in previous discussions and writings as the “Dual Task.”

Political and organizational independence of Marxism

  1. When we refer to work within, or jointly with, or in parallel with formations such as those mentioned above, the issue of the independence of the Marxist organisation is not simply important, it is crucial. Independence means, first, an independent (socialist) program. And, second, a separate organizational structure of the Marxists, so that their forces have coherence and collectively work out the analyses and tasks of the period.
  2. When Marxists contribute to the creation of a new formation, they do so based on and projecting their own (socialist-revolutionary-transitional) program. However, they should not do so in an ultimatist manner, they should not turn it into a condition for their participation in conditions where the formation, due to objective conditions and the weakness of the revolutionary forces, cannot but have a reformist character. Reformism will at some point, in one way or another, betray the interests of the movement – ​​this is a given. However, if Marxists have contributed in a substantial way to the building of this new formation, at the time of its crisis they will be able to keep with them a significant part of the forces that will break away from reformism and thus lay the foundations for the mass revolutionary party (one example of the manifestation of this potential was the split of PCL from PRC in Italy, despite its failure to advance later on – see later). Here, we must remember, again, that the Communist International was built in the first years after 1917 through the splits of the SD parties of the 2nd International.

New formations inevitably born again and again

  1. The idea that prevails in some organizations of the Anti-Capitalist Left that they will build the mass party on their own, recruiting and growing without “getting their hands dirty” by collaborating with or working within reformist formations, is naive – and in complete contradiction to the Marxist/Bolshevik tradition. In today’s conditions, where there are mass trade union organizations and reformist, or even former reformist, political organizations, the existence of a vacuum in the Left in no way means that the masses will turn, as if by some “natural law”, to a small revolutionary organization to massify it.
  2. The reality is that these vacuums will tend, for objective reasons, in the present conditions, to be filled by reformist formations. The main reason for this is that when social pressures intensify (e.g. in conditions of an economic crisis) reformist currents or parties that have not yet been exposed, whose bankrupt policies have not yet been tested in the eyes of workers, and with means far superior to those at the disposal of Marxists, will intervene, moving to the left under social pressures, in order to cover the vacuum. Reformism always offers an easier path than that of the Marxists, because what it calls upon the working-class masses to do is simply to vote for the reformist party in order to strengthen its position in parliament. Without correct tactics towards them, Marxists cannot achieve their strategic goals.
  3. The decades after the capitalist restoration in the former Stalinist countries have provided many examples of the creation of new leftist formations. Many of them no longer exist or have disintegrated – such as the Communist Refoundation in Italy, the Scottish Socialist Party, the Socialist Alliance and Respect in England, the New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA – split into two small remnants) in France, etc. A second generation of such parties, that acquired mass dimensions through the global crisis of 2007-8-9, such as SYRIZA, Podemos, the Left Bloc in Portugal, etc., were tested, capitulated to the pressures of capital, degenerated, found themselves faced with disintegrating crises. In Europe, of the parties created in the previous 10 to 15 years, only La France Insoumise still shows significant dynamics and to a lesser extent The Left (Die Linke) in Germany. In Latin America, among the important formations, the FIT-U (Left Labor Front – Unity) in Argentina maintains significant strength and potential. In Brazil, the PSOL has made a major shift to the right and is in crisis.
  4. Some of the main characteristics of the new formations that have been created in the course of the past three and a half decades are:
    • They do not have the kind of roots in the working class that the parties of the traditional Left, SD or CP, had.
    • They are not characterized, to the same extent as the traditional working-class parties, by the existence of local organizations/branches in which there is active participation of members and intervention in the movements – they are mainly organizations of electoral mechanisms with the middle classes dominating the composition and leadership.
    • They are tested, fail and degenerate in a very short time, unlike the traditional parties that took decades. The main explanation for this is that today’s capitalist crisis leaves no room for reforms. This is one of the reasons why the Far Right is on the rise.

Your Party (UK) and DSA (USA)

  1. Despite the fact that the NLFs of the last 3 decades are tested, fail, capitulate and degenerate or disappear, as long as the vacuum in the Left remains it cannot but be filled with new formations – sooner or later.
  2. Two recent examples are indicative: the first in Britain, the second in the US. In Britain, Your Party has emerged, led by Jeremy Corbyn and Zarah Sultana – although its development is not certain due to internal conflicts. Corbyn was tested again in the 2015-19 period when he was leader of the Labour Party and failed tragically. He left the right wing intact, which went as far as to expel him after his fall; but even when he was expelled, he did not dare to proceed with the creation of a new party of the Left. The move was ultimately made by Sultana, who came out in the open, and Corbyn was forced to follow. Thus, despite his failure in the second part of the 2010s the capitalist crisis and the vacuum on the Left brought Corbyn back to the fore.
  3. In the US, Bernie Sanders and the DSA also emerged after the mid-2010s and had a significant rise. But they too failed miserably to offer a way out. Despite the attack he received from the Democratic Party (DP) establishment, Sanders remained in it and supported Biden rather than take the initiative for the creation of a new party. The DSA lost ground in the years that followed, especially during the Biden presidency, but with the return of Trump after the autumn 2024 elections, it is showing dynamic growth again – the victory of Zoran Mamdani, who belongs to the DSA, in the New York mayoral race is indicative.
  4. The retreat, capitulation and degeneration of the organizations of the Left, when there is no revolutionary alternative, certainly constitutes a defeat for the mass movement. It means a cost which, among other things, may delay the emergence of a new generation of new parties of the New Left. But as long as the vacuum exists, processes will emerge that will lead there. The path may be very different from country to country, depending on the conditions and traditions. If Marxists follow the right tactics and gather the necessary critical mass, the crisis of the reformist formations can provide the potential for creating important revolutionary organizations or parties.

Forms of action and intervention in left-wing formations

  1. The way in which Marxists can intervene in the processes for the formation of a NLF can take various forms:
    • The entryism tactic can be applied, either on a short or long-term basis, depending on circumstances.
    • There can be orientation towards an NLF, without entry into it – this means that we seek collaborations, participate in joint campaigns, stand on common lists in elections, etc.
    • There can be a combination of entryism and orientation – that is, the Marxist organization can officially remain independent and oriented towards the NLF, but part of its members, if the circumstances favor it and its structures allow it, can participate in the NLF.
    • Under certain conditions, in which the Anti-Capitalist Left may have a strong presence in society, an initiative may be taken to bring together the forces of different anti-capitalist organizations with the aim of forming a new political entity, with federal characteristics (i.e. a common organization, together with workers and youth not affiliated to anyone of the constituent organisations, with parallel full independence of the organizations that make it up).

The issue of size

  1. Size is one of the important factors that determine which tactics are best to follow. If the Marxist organization does not exceed a small number of a few dozen members, entryism is often the only way out – if there is a force to enter, that is. In such cases it is advisable that Marxists be present in a broader or a mass formation, to avoid isolation which risks leading them to a microcosm mentality outside the reality of society and mass consciousness.
  2. However, if the organization consists of several hundred or a few thousand members, and has a significant independent presence within the working class and other social movements, then entryism may not be the best tactic. Because the cost of identifying with the shortcomings of a reformist party could be greater than the benefits from it. In such cases, a combination of “orientation” with the partial entry of a section of the membership may be the best approach.
  3. Taking initiatives for the formation of an NLF, through the alliance of a number of organizations of the anti-capitalist Left, has as a prerequisite the existence of significant forces. Such an initiative must be addressed to organizations that understand the concept of the United Front tactic – meaning readiness to appeal to reformist (or non-revolutionary) parties for joint initiatives and actions. The alliance of small marginal organizations of the “revolutionary” Left is not only not an end in itself but can be very dangerous if these organizations have sectarian characteristics.

Some examples

  1. In what follows we will share some examples from our work in a number of countries. Through them, we will try to show the wealth of tactical options that can be adopted, the flexibility that is necessary, both generally speaking but also in concrete cases, as well as the multiplicity of tasks even within a single country.

Greece

  1. Greece over the last 15 years provides some very useful examples. In a first phase, Xekinima (“X”) decided to join SYRIZA in 2008. The discussion that had preceded it for several months, in combination with the relevant conference texts, explained that “X” was not joining with the aim to “change SYRIZA”, because that would be non-realistic, but to strengthen the presence of Marxism both inside and outside SYRIZA. The comrades saw the possibility of the creation of left-wing opposition tendencies inside SYRIZA. At the same time, they explained that they would not gain (new members) from within SYRIZA but from workers and youth outside, who were increasingly turning towards SYRIZA electorally. SYRIZA had the significant advantage of not placing any conditions or restrictions on the freedom to act as an independent organization and at the same time be an official component of it.
  2. A left-wing opposition in SYRIZA appeared very soon after the comrades’ entry, and “X” played a central role in it – but it could not survive for a long time for reasons that we cannot develop here. The prestige of “X”grew, the comrades came into contact with many new rank and file activists, etc., but were not able to grow at all. The work in SYRIZA absorbed enormous energy, because it meant participation in activities, committees, confrontations, etc, but there was no growth in membership as the vast majority was already organized in the other component organisations – as the comrades had predicted from the beginning. What the comrades could not predict, however, was that they would not be able to win members from the outside either! In fact, “X” lost the most youthful parts of the organization who felt that SYRIZA was not radical/confrontational enough. The organisations’ numbers decreased (“X” also lost its migrant work, mainly due to the crisis) but the worst thing was that the thread with the youth was broken.
  3. In 2011 “X” made a turn. It left SYRIZA as an official component (and no longer had a presence in the General Secretariat and other leading bodies of SYRIZA) and turned to independent work, but kept significant forces within SYRIZA – until the sell-out of 2015. Approximately 1/3 of “X” local organizations had full involvement in the local organizations of SYRIZA, 1/3 had a partial presence in the local SYRIZA organizations with parallel independent work and the remaining 1/3 did exclusively independent work. It goes without saying that until the sellout of 2015, “X” collaborated with SYRIZA at every possible level. It is worth mentioning the 2014 local elections where “X” collaborated simultaneously with SYRIZA (about 60% of the cases) and with ANTARSYA but also with the communist party, KKE, in different electoral districts. This is an indication of how very flexible we can be, depending of course on circumstances. We got a number of comrades elected to local councils (as independents, representing “Xekinima”) on both ANTARSYA’s and SYRIZA’s lists, and were able to use our positions to play a significant role in the mass movements particularly in two municipalities, Zografou in Athens and (the city of) Volos.
  4. Since 2012, when the right-wing course of the SYRIZA leadership became clear, “X” began to promote the need for a new pole of the anti-capitalist Left, in opposition to SYRIZA but also ANTARSYA (the alliance of the anti-capitalist Left which, however, has strong sectarian characteristics, refusing the UF, even towards the KKE!).
  5. In 2025, “X” had a development that may prove to be significant: together with 5 other organizations, it created the Initiative for a new United and Revolutionary Left. The proceedings for its official announcement are expected to be completed within the first half of 2026. The goal will be to create a NLF that has clear anti-capitalist characteristics. The structure will be federal: it will have common local organizations, campaigns, etc., but at the same time the organizations that comprise it will be able to act independently, with their own political programme, intervention and organizational structure.

Cyprus

  1. Cyprus was affected by developments in Greece. In 2012, in the south of Cyprus, having a big Greek community, a branch of SYRIZA was developed. SYRIZA’s initial success as an alternative to the traditional left in Greece inspired also Greek Cypriots, and gave birth to two attempts, ERAS (2012-2013) and DRASY-EYLEM (2014), as NLFs that challenged the traditional left party, AKEL, which was then in power. Even though the life of both these two NLFs was short, they helped in laying the ground for the attempt to build an anti-capitalist left pole, today. In 2023, NEDA took the initiative to call on the rest of the anti-capitalist space to work for the creation of an alliance of the anticapitalist Left. The venture did not yield results, but it helped build an important cooperation with the local DiEM25. As a result, a number of common campaigns and initiatives were organized.
  2. Next step of this venture was to expand the attempt to the north of Cyprus, as NEDA had done with DRASY-Eylem in the 2014 Euro elections. In that way our comrades came into contact with the organization “Road to Independence” with which there is agreement on many crucial points of the current international situation. This organization declares itself revolutionary and there is agreement on issues such as the war in Ukraine and Palestine, as well as on the class approach to the Cyprus problem. In other words, although the attempt to form an anti-capitalist pole did not yield the expected results, it brought other, positive results, important for our work and for the relations between the organizations of the anti-capitalist Left on both sides of the island.

USA

  1. There should be no illusions in Zoran Mamdani, but his election has to be seen as a reflection of the very important processes that are underway at the base of American society. Mamdani speaks of democratic socialism; he raises class issues concerning housing, public transport, public grocery stores, etc., exposing the bankruptcy of Identity Politics that the Democratic Party has had on its banner; he speaks openly in favor of the rights of the Palestinians, etc. He won despite his low initial odds and the massive campaign against him by the establishment, which accuses him of “anti-Semitism” (Trump accuses him even…  of “communism”). As we wrote in other texts, the mass movement in the US is in some respects ahead of the European ones, having not experienced the betrayals of the European Left, old and new.
  2. The US is a case that lends itself to a combination of tactics and not just one. Forces that have left the ISA and with which we are in close contact are involved in a process of joining DSA. A number of comrades have already joined, initially on an exploratory basis. DSA offers the advantage already mentioned of “dual membership” – that is, it does not require one to leave their organization in order to become a member. At the same time, comrades who are considering joining DSA have their own independent movement initiatives with a clear working-class orientation, at a city level. These two tactics are not at all contradictory or mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are both correct and complementary.
  3. At the same time, in the case of Seattle, we have the campaign organized by WSB (Workers’ Strike Back) and RW (Revolutionary Workers) for Public Health and for the candidacy of Kshama Sawant for Congress. This is a very important and bold move, which has the potential to reward WSB and RW with great or even spectacular results. The tactic being followed in Seattle is correct – and needs the greatest possible support. If successful, it can contribute significantly to the reconstruction of the anti-capitalist, radical but also revolutionary Left in the US – which will certainly have an impact internationally. We should note that the number of WSB members is nearly 20 times the number of members of the political organization (RW). This allows, on the one hand, the development of dynamic campaigns by hundreds of members and, on the other, the possibility of recruitment into RW from the many activists who surround it.

Britain

  1. Corbyn’s and Sultana’s new party, Your Party (YP), has the potential to become the most massive party in the Left but also in relation to any political entity that exists in Europe, as close to 800,000 people have expressed interest in joining it. However, from the very beginning, this party has been in crisis, due to the differences that exist between Sultana and Corbyn – this makes its future uncertain. However, intervention in the processes that are underway is necessary anyway.
  2. ​​The preferred tactic, given our small presence in the UK, is that of entryism, with which there is agreement from all the comrades and friends of ISp. Among the tasks that arise are the fight for the democratic functioning and control of the central structures and leading bodies in order to reduce the personal power of a few individuals who can blow the project up; the right for dual membership (i.e. people belonging to another organization to be able to also participate in YP); the fight, of course, for the adoption of a socialist program; but also the fight to continue the effort to build the YP “from below”, in a democratic way, and against the danger of the two main protagonists cause irreparable damage.
  3. The Corbynistas, as Corbyn’s supporters are known, have a completely unacceptable, bureaucratic behavior, with vertically integrated operating structures, as was seen when they created Momentum, during Corbyn’s first term in the leadership of the Labour Party, and the Collective in the recent period. These experiences bring to the surface the issue of the crucial role that democracy plays within the Left and the need for the base to play a decisive role against the “personalities” that dominate and determine the course of things.

Ireland

  1. In Northern Ireland, which is part of Britain, the developments surrounding the YP had a direct impact. However, due to the specificity of the national issue, no British party is creating a “branch” in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the creation of YP has aroused intense interest and meetings of significant numbers of trade unionists and left-wing activists, who are looking for ways to see how these processes can be reflected in N. Ireland, have taken place. Our comrades are actively participating in these processes, but the direction things will take is not yet clear.

Italy

  1. Entryism has been an important tactic of the Italian comrades in the past decades. Both groups that are connected to the ISp today have their roots in the work that was carried out inside PRC (Partido Refondazione Communista – Communist Refoundation Party) which led to the creation of PCL (Partito Communista del Laboratory – Workers’ Communist Party) in 2006.
  2. The PRC was created in 1991, initially as a movement and soon afterwards as a party. It was the first party of the “first generation” of NLFs, after the collapse of Stalinism and the split of the Italian Communist Party. PRC was a party with mass appeal, with around 110,000 members and with quite a free and democratic internal life – an actual operation of regroupment, particularly after the departure of its Stalinist wing in 1997. The comrades were inside PRC initially as members of Democracia Proletaria (Workers’ Democracy), one of the 3 main constituents of PRC in 1991, then as part of Projecto Communista (Communist Project – PC). PC was initially an alliance of radical left elements in the party but it was founded on a programmatic base and progressively became a clear Trotskyist current. It was made up of 700-1000 members and received between 3,000 to 5,000 votes on its documents in the PRC conferences.
  3. PRC joined the centre left Prodi government in 2006. PC promptly resigned from the PRC and very soon afterwards went ahead with the creation of PCL, which started off with 1260 members.
  4. PCL was founded on a programmatic base and became progressively a clear Trotskyist organization, able to keep its membership around 1,000 for about a decade before it ended up in crisis, rapid decline and splits. In the EU elections of 2009 PCL stood in 3 out of the 5 electoral constituencies nationally and received a total of 166,000 votes – 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9% respectively. From 2015 onwards there was a clear sectarian drift in the PCL, which can be explained, objectively, by the conditions of a lull in the Italian movement both as regards the Left and the trade union movement and subjectively by the limitations of its leadership. PCL today is a small sect – however this does not change the fact that the tactic of entryism enabled the formation of a sizeable Trotskyist organisation, which with a different leadership could have possibly kept its forces and play a role in future events.

Turkey

  1. In Turkey, an earlier attempt to build a New Left Formation was the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP), founded in the mid-1990s as a broad alliance of various socialist, feminist, green and libertarian currents. ÖDP combined federal elements (distinct internal platforms and tendencies) with a relatively open internal democracy, but it never succeeded in building roots in the working class. In practice, the party functioned largely as a loose electoral front of fragmented currents and urban activist milieus, with important sectors oriented more to parliamentary representation and NGO-type campaigns than to systematic work in workplaces and unions.
  2. The example of Turkey shows that entryism is not always a simple, easy process that brings certain results. After a fairly successful independent work in the 2010s, our comrades found themselves faced with the extremely difficult objective conditions that followed the coup attempt against Erdogan in 2016. In the years that followed, the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) emerged, which grew at an impressive pace, from a few hundred to tens of thousands. Our comrades joined TİP but it turned out that the party’s bureaucracy, with Stalinist roots, refused to accept different voices – and very soon we found ourselves outside. We did this as part of a group of more than 100 that left the party, but even in this new group the regime proved to be completely inflexible towards different views – and again our comrades found themselves outside.
  3. Today, there is an attempt to reorient our work towards the Green Left Party (GLP). GLP is a radical left party, situated to the left of the traditional social-democratic and Stalinist currents, and it operates as one of the components of DEM (formerly HDP), the “pro-Kurdish” left formation that has consistently won around 10–13% in national elections despite severe state repression. DEM is structured as a federal formation: different organisations, movements and local collectives can participate with a high degree of autonomy. Within this framework, GLP formally recognizes internal tendencies and currents and allows for relatively open political debate and public platforms. This creates, at least in principle, a much broader space for Marxists to intervene openly and to test their ideas in front of wider layers. At the same time, GLP remains an electoral party, shaped by the pressures of parliamentary representation, the national question and ongoing state repression. The turn towards GLP must therefore combine systematic work inside the party with the preservation of our independent organisation, programme and structures outside it.

Nigeria

  1. The tactic of long-term entryism played an important role in the work of the Nigerian comrades for a long historical period and contributed significantly to the creation of the largest Trotskyist organization in an African country, until the split of the CWI in 2018-9. In the recent period, the comrades have oriented themselves and joined the AAC (African Action Congress) under the leadership of Omoyele Yele Sowore, one of the most militant activists for democratic and labor rights in Nigeria.
  2. This party has strong personal elements, as it is built around the name of Sowore. Nevertheless, it offers possibilities as it does not set any conditions for our comrades of the Revolutionary Socialist Movement to join the party and operate at the same time as an independent organization. The aim here too is to contribute to the building and massification of the AAC and at the same time to build the forces of our own organization.

Brazil

  1. Our comrades in Brazil operate within the lines of PSOL (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade – Socialism and Liberty Party). PSOL has moved dramatically to the right in recent years, operating as a left-wing allied force in the center-left government of Lula. Despite its rightward movement, PSOL has not split – a significant left wing remains within its lines.
  2. Our comrades participate in PSOL, as part of the internal left opposition. PSOL is structured with federal characteristics. That is, each organization has significant autonomy in action and the independence of its political program. There is no obstacle to joint campaigns and actions with the left wing of PSOL in parallel with the building of our comrades’ work.

Taiwan – Romania

  1. Our organizations in Taiwan and Romania have some common characteristics, both subjectively and in terms of objective conditions. On the subjective level, both are new organizations, with strong youth characteristics, energetic and active. On the objective level, there are no Left parties that can fill the vacuum that exists in society. This means that if our comrades manage to utilize the possibilities provided by the existence of the vacuum, they can develop rapidly and create sizeable revolutionary organizations in a relatively short period of time.
  2. In both countries, our comrades are developing dynamic youth work. In Taiwan, the creation of “clubs” in a number of universities with orientations on various issues, from youth and education to solidarity to labor struggles, has brought us into contact with broader layers not only of youth but also of workers. It also brings us significant growth.
  3. There is no left party in which, theoretically, there could be an orientation or some kind of entry, in either country. But there are also no other anti-capitalist organizations with a significant presence to discuss the possibility of taking joint initiatives for the creation of an NLF. Independent work is of most importance in these countries, focusing on larger strata of workers and youth instead of smaller groups.
  4. In such circumstances, we can take initiatives with a broader impact, using the method of the united front – as distinct from the UF as such in the classical sense. We can take the step for forming either youth or broader movement initiatives, in which our members can participate, together with people who are or want to be active in the movement. To the examples that we already see the comrades implementing, we can add other examples from our international experience: such as anti-racist-anti-fascist initiatives (Youth Against Racism in Europe), environmental groups (Green Attack, Kasma Birak), feminist movements (Combative and Free) etc.
  5. Internal democracy is of great importance for the successful operation of such initiatives – but at the same time, care needs to be taken to involve grassroots workers and youth in them and not petty bourgeois elements as mentioned above. Also, action is a very important element – ​​workers and working-class youth turn to such initiatives in order to act, not only to discuss. Of course, the more advanced elements will want to delve deeper into the issues – something that only the participation in the Marxist organization, where the necessary political discussions and theoretical elaborations take place, can offer them.
  6. Such broad initiatives can have structures, in the sense of elected bodies and local meetings, but they can also simply have the character of a “campaign”. It is always preferable to have organized structures, but this is very demanding at the level of cadres and we need to be careful not to stretch ourselves beyond our capabilities.
  7. In parallel with the building of such “broader formations”, the Marxist organization must explain that an independent, mass party of the working class needs to be created to defend its own interests. It is important, where possible, that the Marxist organization tries to describe the social, trade union, and political organizations that could take the initiative for such a party.

The necessary conditions for success

  1. All of the above show how flexible we need to be in terms of our tactics. The results of the tactical decisions we take must be monitored, in order to check whether we are implementing the best possible tactics. As mentioned above, there is not, generally speaking, one and only correct tactical choice. Linked to the methodology of the UF (which is by definition a broad and flexible concept) all options are under discussion and should be measured against their results.
  2. The results of any tactical decision are measurable – that is, at the end of a specific period we can measure the result, in terms of prestige, the scope of our outreach, our positions in the mass movements, etc., but first and foremost, in terms of new members. Based on such an approach, the Greek comrades in 2011 withdrew from being an official component of SYRIZA and implemented a more flexible model, with a partial presence in SYRIZA and a parallel independent presence, as described above.
  3. When we join an NLF, or when we create one together with others, it is important that our comrades are at the forefront of the efforts to build the new formation. The key point is to turn such a formation towards society, the working class and the youth, to contribute to the development of mass movements and class consciousness.
  4. There are conditions in which the NLF will bring new people into its ranks and will allow us to win members to the revolutionary organization “from within”; but there are also conditions in which we will not gain from inside but only from outside. The “art”, in this context, is to use the NLF to reach new layers, open it to society and at the same time recruit to the organization.
  5. Being in an NLF, we certainly want to influence its course, to push it to the left and if possible, to help in its transformation into a revolutionary party. But we must pursue this without illusions: the transformation of an NFL into a revolutionary party, as a whole and in its totality, is essentially impossible – it can theoretically happen only if we are going through a period of great revolutionary upheavals and we have at the same time the existence of mass revolutionary parties in one or more important countries. Therefore, NLFs in the present epoch, in their course of development, can be expected at some point to split.
  6. The above is another reason why, in addition to the effort to influence through dialogue and comradely discussion the general course of an NLF, the recruitment of individual members into the revolutionary organisation is absolutely crucial. Winning comrades on an individual basis will strengthen our work and also help form left currents in the ranks of an NLF.
  7. The development in the early stages of a small organization is very slow and takes place through individual recruitment. The larger the organisation, the greater the chances of being able to have group recruitments. And after we reach a size that makes us visible in society and the mass movements, i.e., when we reach a “critical mass”, the development can take place in great leaps, given of course the right objective conditions. In general, we need to know that the development of our forces is never linear. And that after a period of growth there may be a period of “stagnation” in numbers, depending, again, on the conditions, which has to do with the processes of consolidation and cadre development. This phase, in turn, will create the conditions for a next leap, if there is no negative change in the objective conditions.
  8. Being in an NLF with reformist characteristics, we must never underestimate the bureaucracy that will develop. The reformist elements that exist in every NLF have no political way to oppose Marxist ideas, and this is why they resort to bureaucratic methods and, ultimately, to splits. Therefore, even if at its beginnings an NLF seems to operate on democratic terms, we must be absolutely cautious and never make any concessions at the level of democratic procedures and control by the party rank and file.
  9. In the early stages of building our organizations, working with the youth is key. Workers will not easily join a very small organization – they first need to measure the ability of that organization to bring results. Of course, when we talk about campaigns targeting youth, we are talking about youth who have working-class backgrounds and not those who come from a wealthy or petty bourgeois background. After the initial accumulation and maturity of our youth cadre, we can make a conscious turn to specific work places and trade union issues.
  10. Which layers we address and in what way is naturally connected to the Transitional Program. There are many on the Left who speak positively of a Transitional Program as well as in favor of socialism. But this does not mean that they have a full understanding of the transitional program and a real strategy for workers’ power and socialism. The method of Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks, as well as the resolutions of the first 4 congresses of the 3rd International, need to be kept alive, and linked to today’s everyday problems and the capitalist crisis. We need to try to transplant this method in any NLF we are part of, to help turn it to the layers that want to enter the fight and thus contribute to changing the balance of forces in the Left.
  11. Under all conditions, we promote the necessity of socialism as the only answer to the capitalist crisis. When necessary, this should be done in a flexible manner and with a language that responds to the needs of our time and the forms of communication of the new generation. In some countries the words “socialism” and “communism” are so worn out that we may need to adapt the expressions we use – e.g. “workers’ power”, “workers’ democracy”, etc., or even “people’s power”, on condition of course of keeping the essence of and explaining the meaning of socialism. “Democracy in the production process” must also accompany our proposals for “workers’ control” and “workers’ management”, with an attempt to describe in specific ways how it will work.
  12. Finally, in the case of operating within an NLF with weak or mistaken political positions, criticism of the of the leadership is something absolutely necessary. But it must be done with sensitivity. It must be done in a positive way and with positive suggestions – about what needs to be corrected in order for the common project to proceed. Otherwise, the party members won’t pay attention to our criticism. There are cases of organizations that enter an NLF and their criticism is so denunciatory or provocatory that it alienates the membership. We emphasize again that the success of our work in an NLF depends on the extent to which the base sees us as some of the best fighters in building the organization; then, when we criticize the leadership, in a careful and sensitive way, the membership will pay attention to what we say – this is the way to have a greater impact, help push the NLF to the left, increase our weight and strengthen our forces numerically.
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