The text “The Tide, the Class, and the Perspective: Some Reflections on the Past Month and the Coming Autumn.
Twelve Notes on the Overwhelming Movement Against the Genocide in Gaza” is a contribution to the discussion that has opened up within Italian trade unionism about the extraordinary wave of mobilizations that took place a few weeks ago against the genocide in Gaza and in solidarity with the Global Sumud Flotilla. The author, Luca Scacchi, is a university professor and a organizer of FLC CGIL (the union representing workers in education, schools, universities, and research). He is also a member of the General Assembly of the CGIL (its national council), representing the alternative document presented at the nineteenth congress (Le Radici del Sindacato – The Roots of the Union), which is also an organized current in the statutory form of a congressional programmatic area.
In Italy, we have witnessed several waves of mobilization over the past two years. Apologies in advance for the inevitable omissions. I recall here just a few, the first that come to mind, without any particular order or hierarchy, simply to highlight their multiplicity. The opposition to the draft and then to the decree on public security, coordinated by two different networks (A Pieno Regime and Liberi di Lottare). The dispute over the metalworkers’ contract, with 40 hours of strikes by FIOM, FIM and UILM (something not seen in years, both for persistence and for unity of the main metalworker’s unions). The strikes in transport (airlines, local public transport and especially railways) and in logistics. The November 2024 strike by healthcare workers (ANAO, ASSOMED, Nursing Up), with high participation rates across the country. The mobilizations of precarious university workers (March 20, May 12 and June 3), culminating in the first-ever precarious workers’ strike within universities, demanding rights and recognition for research staff as workers. The initiatives in schools against rearmament and militarization, against the “Made in Italy” high school reform, and against Minister Valditara’s authoritarian management, exemplified by the suspension of a teacher for expressing political opinions. The alternative demonstration in Rome on March 15 and the twin protests on June 17 against European rearmament. The marches organized by the GKN Factory Collective for their labor dispute and broader uprising since May 2024, alongside the many struggles in companies, factories, and offices threatened with closure or drastic restructuring. The demonstration in Milan at the beginning of September against the eviction of Leoncavallo, the security policies, and the speculative urban politics of the city. The general strike of November 29, 2024, which seemed to move beyond the fragmented pattern of CGIL and UIL initiatives of recent years [two of the main three Italian union, editor’s note], convergence with other grassroots unions and social collectives (CUB, SGB, Cobas, Clap, APU, etc.), bringing renewed participation to the streets compared with previous years. These mobilizations, however—like those led by students, environmental activists, or movements against evictions and the crisis—have often been out of sync, unfolding at different times and rhythms. Moreover, they have frequently remained limited in scope, struggling to generate the mass involvement that would be necessary.
The working class is divided. The double recession of 2009–2012, the Great Recession, and the intensification of international competition have multiplied strategies of accumulation and generated deep diversification within the country’s productive structure. These dynamics have resulted in a growing divergence within the world of labor — a process that first deepened during the pandemic and then again with the surge of inflation.
The working class has thus become further stratified, beyond the traditional fault lines that have long characterized this country (South and North; men and women; public and private sectors; permanent and precarious workers; residents and migrants from other regions or countries). It has fragmented across sectors, professions, and workplaces. The increasingly uneven conditions of wages and labor, as well as the differentiated cycles of struggle, tend to produce subjectivities and identities that are ever more fragmented — a multitude of labor. In my experience, this is exemplified by the multiplication of actors and demands among precarious school workers over the past decade, though similar dynamics can be traced in virtually every sector and field. The disarticulation of labor becomes especially evident in the difficulties faced by general strikes in the past decade, highlighting the challenge of reconstituting a shared, collective struggle in the current historical phase.
This (dis)organization of the working class influences the trade unions and their activity, beyond the historical limits of Italian unionism: the subsidiary and government-aligned development of the CISL [Italian historical catholic union, with 4 milions of adherent, editor’s note], with a return to its 1950s roots; the unstable opportunism of the UIL [Italian historical right-wing reformist union, with 2 milions of adherent, editor’s note], oscillating between verbal radicalism and practices complicit with employers; the historically reformist, negotiation-oriented, and “responsible” approach of much of the CGIL [Italian main union, reformist, with 5 milions of adherent, editor’s note]; the professional orientation of the autonomous unions; and the competitive politicization among the various grassroots union organizations. Thus, while autonomous and professional unions have grown in some sectors (healthcare, education, public administration, and beyond), CISL and UIL have interpreted in their own way a role of organizing the workforce (as a simple factor of production cooperating with management) and representing various specific interests, maintaining—and even expanding—their role within the working class. To cite just one partial figure: since 2000, CISL’s declared membership has risen from about 3.5 to 4.2 million, while UIL’s has increased from 1.7/1.8 to over 2 million.
Conflictual and grassroots unionism today is divided not only by differing political orientations and projects but also by its roots in distinct sectors and class compositions, making it increasingly difficult to grasp and articulate a general perspective of labor. Even the CGIL, a mass general union, is increasingly marked not only by the moderation of its leadership and by the development of subsidiary practices or individual protections within its structure (such as bilateral workers-capital entities to manage unemployment, training, etc., tax and consulting services, etc.), but also by the inconsistencies and contradictions arising from a widening gap between union practices and models throughout its organization, starting from its various categories. Thus, over the past three years, the CGIL has repeatedly refrained from triggering a direct confrontation with the government—beginning with the “autumn of dialogue” following Meloni’s election, which culminated in the unusual invitation extended to her to attend the union’s congress. In recent months, despite its stated goal of giving continuity to the strikes against the budget law, the CGIL has shifted its initiative toward the terrain of referendums (“the vote is our revolt”), focusing on the ballot box rather than the streets—an approach that, moreover, resulted in a predictable defeat.
Certainly, some events have broken through the barriers. In particular, the outraged reaction to several brutal femicides (especially that of student Giulia Cecchettin in the autumn of 2023) further broadened the path opened by Non Una di Meno and spread criticism of the patriarchal culture in our society. The Pride marches, now held not only in major metropolitan centers but also in towns and smaller cities—from Aosta to Trapani, from Bolzano to Terni—have also played a part. These demonstrations have taken on the characteristics of a tidal wave, involving huge numbers of participants—from hundreds of thousands in the big cities to thousands in smaller towns—mainly young people, but ultimately of all ages and social classes. This participation is therefore popular, in the sense of its mass dimension, yet also cross-cutting, involving sectors of the middle classes and even parts of the managerial class, especially in both large and small urban contexts. However, these mobilizations are essentially occasional: they express themselves through specific dates or events, independent of strategic perspectives or structured demands, capturing and channeling a broad public sentiment without organizing participation territorially through spaces, moments, or ongoing processes of debate (assemblies, committees, and coordination networks). The structures that trigger and organize these demonstrations create the opportunity to bring together this mass expression, but do not significantly shape its trajectory, since this “tide” contains multiple currents and orientations—each simply immersed or participating, with no real places for dialogue, discussion, synthesis, or radicalization.
Up until this summer, mobilizations over Gaza and the genocide had been limited. Several cities witnessed marches or weekly sit-ins. In February 2024, a demonstration in Milan brought together over 20,000 people, uniting Palestinian movements, grassroots and militant unions, and political and social left-wing forces. During the spring, student encampments spread across many universities, alongside initiatives denouncing collaborations with Israel. On October 5 of last year, a march was held in Rome with over 10,000 participants, marked both by a ban imposed by the police headquarters and by divisions within the protest itself. Over the course of this year, a broader awareness has gradually grown, because of the famine caused by the siege, the threats of ethnic cleansing, and Israel’s genocidal practices. Although mobilizations have long remained limited in scale. A sign of change, in some sense, came in early June, with the demonstration organized by the parliamentary opposition (PD, Five Star Movement, and AVS), which brought tens of thousands—if not hundreds of thousands—of people into the streets.
The movement of recent weeks has therefore been surprising, unexpected and counter to prevailing trends. It not only suddenly took on the scale of a tidal wave, marked by broad youth and student mobilization, but also intertwined in an unforeseen way with the form of the general strike: the protagonism of labor and its organized actors, the determined and widespread blockade of ring roads and railways, and an unusually intense wave of initiatives (three general strikes within two weeks, repeated marches and sit-ins over several days—a sort of ongoing state of agitation). This mobilization thus witnessed an extraordinarily broad participation—hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people in the streets—the largest seen in many years, and it took on the features of a true social movement. Here, we attempt to highlight some observations on this sudden and extraordinary dynamic.
1. The Need for a Trigger. In Italy, there are several tens of thousands of militants and activists of the so-called left. They are active in trade unions, parties, social centers, associations, and local committees. Yet this broad social and political vanguard is essentially fragmented into a multitude of organizations and entities, with no actor today capable of emerging naturally as a reference point or a catalyst for mass initiative. The CGIL, the only structure that still maintains a stable mass dimension and reach, largely refuses to take on this role. On one hand, it aspires to represent a social force broader than what is currently recognized as the left; on the other, its historically moderate leadership is tempted to look toward the so-called campo largo [broad field: a wide democratic and progressive front extending well beyond the political and social boundaries of the left].
AVS [Alleanza Verdi Sinistra, Alliance Green Left, the main parliamentary party of the left] is today more an electoral and opinion-based subject than an organizing one: it receives roughly the same vote share as the PRC but has a very different capacity for social activation and mobilization. Conflictual and grassroots unionism remains limited in size—both in membership (around 120,000–150,000 in total) and in its foothold across sectors and regions—and is further marked by historic internal divisions and rivalries. The remaining organizations now have comparable militant bases and mass projections, but are characterized by divisive dynamics and open competition, often even among different strategic projects within the same groups [PRC, PAP, ecc]. The so-called antagonist networks are today numerous yet largely de-structured, with a significant renewal of reference points and national coordination compared to past decades. Above all, this broad vanguard has become disconnected from its social roots: it no longer possesses an automatic capacity for representation, involvement, and organization of mobilization in workplaces or local territories. Even the CGIL has struggled to self-generate mobilizations capable of engaging hundreds of thousands or millions of people in the last decade, despite its will and its enduring mass structure (a widespread presence across sectors and regions, several million members, two million of whom are active workers, some 150,000–180,000 workplace shop-steward and local leaders, and around 20,000 union officials and executives). In other words, Italy’s social and political left today often resembles a disjointed vanguard of itself, rarely able to perceive or nurture genuine popular movements. Even the pro-Palestinian mobilizations failed to break these boundaries or gain mass traction: they were built and limited over the past two years by the Palestinian community, migrant communities and second-generation youth, religious networks within the Islamic community, and sectors of the social and political left. That is why, to set off the extraordinary movement of September, an external trigger was needed: the Global Sumud Flotilla. This initiative captured the public imagination and became an occasion to crystallize a widespread sentiment. The reasons why a mass movement ignites are always difficult to pinpoint, but three factors likely played a role. The widespread perception that this was a concrete action through which people could finally have an impact on an international dynamic that had previously seemed remote and inevitable. The dual purpose of the initiative—both direct aid (food) and breaking the siege of Gaza—thus tightly linking solidarity in action with its political meaning. The fact that the initiative did not belong to anyone—it was not tied to a single organization—which allowed it to activate broad networks of mobilization. The deep popular sympathy for the initiative became evident as early as late August, when in Genoa (through Music for Peace and the port workers), a popular collection drive began—one that exceeded every expectation and transcended all organizational boundaries.
2. An Incubation Environment: The Education Sectors. The great majority of participants in the demonstrations and initiatives of recent weeks have been young people—students, including very young ones (in their first years of high school)—joined by education, university, and research workers. Of course, other groups were also present: employees and retirees, families and even many children (one of the most popular signs was “define child?”, in a controversial reference to a question posed by Eyal Mizrahi, president of the Friends of Israel association, during a television broadcast), activists, militants, trade unionists, and members of political and social organizations. Yet, the fundamental core of the marches came from the world of education. It was this core that promoted the massive participation seen in large metropolitan cities (the tens of thousands who took to the streets in Rome on September 22 and then practically for four consecutive days, from Wednesday, October 1 to Saturday, October 4; the huge demonstrations in Milan and Bologna; the large ones in Florence, Genoa, Venice, Padua, Catania, Palermo, Naples, Bari, and so on) and that ensured the unexpected continuity of those demonstrations (many began in the morning and lasted until evening, following long routes through the cities and with significant turnover among participants). It was this same education core that enabled the impressive territorial spread of the mobilizations: sit-ins and demonstrations in all major cities, many towns, and even small centers, with marches of 500, 1,000, 3,000, or 5,000 people in Aosta, Rimini, Ragusa, Urbino, Massa, Potenza, Civitavecchia, Verbania, Lanciano, Teramo, Monza, Isernia, Breno, Borgosesia, Iglesias, Biella [Italian towns in the north, center, and south with a few tens of thousands of inhabitants, editor’s note], and many, many other places. The rallies during past general strikes were often marked by red and blue colors: banners, flags, vests, hoodies, and T-shirts of the unions. Instead, the demonstrations of the past month were characterized above all by a free and fluid participation, with workers and students not organized by unions, parties or other entities: marches starting from schools, universities, and neighborhoods, converging into the main squares under the banners of their workplace. Demonstrations of a movement. Significant in this dynamic has been the participation of personnel from schools, universities, and research institutions, who also joined the strikes. Admittedly, if we look at the official data (in the so-called “strike dashboard”), the figures might seem rather limited (in Education and Research, participation was 11.31% on September 22 and 9.19% on October 3). They are. However, it is worth noting that these figures reflect the national average: participation reached 40% in regions such as Tuscany and Emilia, and in cities like Florence, Livorno, Piacenza, Bologna, Milan, and Rome, where many institutions closed completely. Finally, these participation rates are higher than those of November 29, 2024, or November 17, 2023 (6.09% and 7.16%, respectively). In fact, two-thirds of public-sector strikers came from the knowledge sector (125,000 out of 164,000 on September 22, and 99,000 out of 144,000 on October 3), whereas the share is usually around 50%.
3. A Path of Incubation: How the Mobilizations Grew and Emerged. The movement exploded with the strikes of September 22 and October 3, as well as with the incredible national march on October 4. Yet the wave had already begun in the first days of September, precisely with the reopening of schools and universities and with the growing momentum of the Flotilla initiative. In other words, the movement took on a clear mass dynamic in the second half of September, but it had been growing at a molecular level for weeks—if not months—beforehand, starting from the outrage over hunger, the massacre of children, the siege of Gaza, and the images and reports that began to fill public discourse. This gradual process of mass activation expressed itself through self-organized, widespread, and sometimes improvised forms. The initiatives of the very first days of September in support of the Flotilla were often organized through Facebook, Instagram, or WhatsApp, without any significant mediation from formal organizations or structures. Yet this activation also manifested through many small gestures across schools, universities, and research institutions, which nurtured growing awareness and collective action: motions passed by faculty councils on Gaza and the genocide; Palestinian flags hung from windows or worn as pins; moments of silence at the beginning of the school year; classroom discussions based on newspapers and photographs; petitions to suspend projects and research collaborations with Israeli universities or institutions; and documents presented within departments and academic senates. Upon this fabric of collective reactions within schools, universities, and research bodies was built the broader participation in marches and strikes, the pressure on trade unions, and even the determination to ignore or defy government bans. In fact, the Ministry of Education had promptly mobilized regional offices and school principals, attempting to suppress these initiatives from the outset by calling teachers’ councils and staff back to order. Yet this attempt at control soon lost its force, as it became clear that the initiatives were spreading anyway across hundreds and even thousands of schools.
4. The Crucial Role of the Strike and the Dockworkers’ call. The very form of the strike was crucial, and so was the dockworkers’ call to action. The general strike is not a frequent form of mobilization in schools and universities, even less so among students. Yet this movement impacted society as a whole—and even reached an international dimension—precisely because it involved the working class, and with it, the potential power to bring the country to a halt. In fact, this form of action speaks transversally to the multiplicity of conditions, subjectivities, and social strata within our society; it underscores that if one aims to influence policies of broad, systemic significance—such as those concerning peace and war—one must halt society as a whole, and to do so, one must start from the sphere of production. A few years ago, the struggle of the GKN Factory Collective had already brought renewed attention to labor and its role in contemporary society, through the occupation of the factory, the generalization of its initiative, and the #insorgiamo (“let’s rise up”) movement. These recent weeks may have once again placed the strike at the center: as a tool for expressing conflict and unifying the working class. However, this impulse did not originate from the education sector. It came from a specific segment of the central industrial working class, unionized, internationally connected, and with a long-standing sensitivity to issues of peace and war: the dockworkers. Amid the growing awareness and mobilization that developed over the summer, it was the Genoese dockworkers who grasped the need for action—to block ships carrying weapons or dual-use materials bound for Israel—and, above all, who proposed the general strike as a means of supporting the Flotilla. It was CALP (the Autonomous Collective of Dockworkers of the Port of Genoa), long active against war and rearmament, that publicly launched the call to “block everything if the Flotilla is attacked.” This slogan intertwined with the food collection campaign led by Music for Peace (a grassroot antiwar association), building astonishing public support. USB (Unione Sindacale di Base, a grassroots union), closely linked to CALP, had the intelligence and determination to take up the call and implement it, starting from a popular assembly in Genoa. Certainly, we know that USB also seized the opportunity with an organizational mindset, in the midst of ongoing debates within grassroots unionism about the upcoming autumn mobilizations. USB essentially overwhelming the coordination with Music for Peace, forcing the timing of the strike, and betting on placing itself at the center of the dynamic. All things considered, we like to recall the words with which Music for Peace thanked CULMV for his activation and support in collecting food for the flotilla. The CULMV is the company of the so-called camalli (dockworkers of Genoa), an organization different by CALP, historically influenced by Lotta Comunista (and in recent months, Lotta Comunista has sparked controversy for calling for unity between Palestinian and Israeli workers against both nationalist leaderships). “We also take this opportunity to clarify that the initiative certainly began from the cooperation between Music for Peace and CALP in Genoa, but it was raised up by the entire population. For the first time, it was not the organizations that carried the people forward, but the people who carried along the organizations, associations, institutions, and everyone! You may write and share reflections, proclamations, doubts, and so on—but instead, you should walk together, united. We must understand that this is not about visibility or about who does it best. Refusing to share this journey means doubting that citizens truly have the power to change things. Let us look beyond competition and not judge those beside us. The beauty of this wave lies precisely in unity—everyone, with their differences, joined by a single goal.” Precisely for this reason—and despite the missteps along the way—I, like many others, supported the general strike of September 22, as was also evident in the statement of my union current (Radici del sindacato nella FLC CGIL). In the prism of these September weeks, the fragilities and repetitive patterns of Italian trade unionism have again been revealed. Fortunately, among the many responses that unfolded, some maintained the focus on developing the movement and building unit. A path of convergence prevailed, at least for the time being, overcoming organizational resistance.
5. The Unexpected Estrangement of Part of Italian Trade Unionism. The growing wave of public attention and mass mobilization drew in organizations, associations, and trade unions. Yet not all of them. Some chose not to take part and instead distanced themselves from this movement: UIL, CISL, and the autonomous and professional unions. The position of UIL is not surprising—marked by its opportunism and constant pursuit of sectoral representation—especially considering the presence of factions within it that have now been largely absorbed into the reactionary right in certain sectors and regions. The fragmented general strikes of CGIL and UIL in the 2022 and 2023 were, after all, an attempt to manage this peculiar internal composition. In any case, in light of its upcoming 19th Congress (Padua, July 2–4, 2026), following the CGIL’s defeat in the recent referendum, amid the stagnation of separate public-sector contract renewals, and on the eve of the autumn mobilizations, this estrangement is hardly accidental. It speaks, rather, to the union’s ongoing adaptation—confirmed by its early evaluations of the new budget law. The choice made by CISL is more predictable, fitting within the subsidiary and government-aligned framework emphasized under Fumarola’s leadership [the new general secretary of the union, editor’s note], given the clear opposition between the mobilizations and the government’s positions. Yet, the movement against genocide inevitably touched upon the Catholic-inspired values traditionally present within this union. The result was a visible sense of discomfort, at times even openly expressed [there was an open letter in a catholic newspaper of a former general secretary, who emphasized the unease caused by the absence of the CISL trade union from anti-war protests and demonstrations in these weeks]. Autonomous and professional trade unions are particularly influential in the education and research sectors, the very heart of this movement. In the most recent workplace representation elections (RSU), SNALS received 11.6%, GILDA 8.0%, and ANIEF 7.9%. Certainly, as the regional secretary of one of these unions wrote to a teacher: “We are an autonomous and non-ideological union whose purpose is to defend the rights of school workers and to improve the quality of education… consequently, we have never joined or promoted strikes lacking a specific objective or motivated solely by political opposition—actions that have nothing to do, not only with contractual demands, but even with other aspects that directly concern our work (the budget law, workplace safety, improvements in healthcare).” Such positions, then, may have been predictable but they were not inevitable. Italian Catholic and moderate unionism has never historically stood apart from anti-war mobilizations. Those movements have deep roots in Italy’s labor tradition, going back to the protests against intervention in Libya in 1911 or against Italy’s entry into the First World War in 1914–15. CISL, UIL, and at least some autonomous unions could have participated in these mobilizations with their own distinct approach or agenda—even if moderating or alternative in character, relative to the demands and dynamics of the broader movement. Instead, they chose absence—a decision that, in its own way, marks a noteworthy new development.
6. The Role of Grassroots and Militant Trade Unionism. As noted earlier, the broad support for the Flotilla initiative enabled the emergence of mass dynamics within the mobilization, and the call for a strike made it possible to consolidate them into a general framework. Grassroots and militant trade unionism played a fundamental—and consequently commendable—role in this process: it was among the first to lead the pro-Palestinian and anti-genocide mobilizations. It was also able to recognize the shift in public sentiment surrounding the Flotilla initiatives and, as we saw with the Genoa dockworkers, to be the first to give shape to the idea of a general strike. Thus, USB, CUB, SGB, and AdL Varese proclaimed the first general strike on September 22. As we have seen, this process was not without tensions, within both the Genoese movement and the broader field of militant unionism. The declaration of the strike sparked criticism from SiCobas (which had been active in pro-Palestine initiatives since October 2023), even as it ultimately participated. UniCobas chose to distance itself, while there were telling silences from Confederazione Cobas/Cobas Scuola and other groups. These tensions and unilateral decisions were also evident in the management of rallies—both on September 22 and October 3—probably reawakening long-standing resentments and creating new divisions within a grassroots union movement that remains deeply fragmented. Nonetheless, within the surge that ultimately overwhelmed any illusion of centralized control or leadership over a diverse and multifaceted mass movement, the various grassroots and militant unions undoubtedly deserve credit for having helped spark and sustain the mobilization.
7. Resistances, Difficulties, and Turning Points within the CGIL. The CGIL was overtaken by the wave of popular unity that fueled these mobilizations. After the joint general strike with UIL last November and the defeat in the June referendum, the CGIL had retreated into an internal debate over its strategies, trade union models, and future leadership structure. This discussion diluted its autumn agenda, aside from a national demonstration already scheduled for October 25, 2025. By early September, however, its widespread grassroots presence—its network of territorial structures and workplace delegates—had already sensed and reported the shifting mood and growing activism surrounding the Global Sumud Flotilla. Yet, the organization itself had not played a particularly active role, having in recent years shown limited engagement with the movement for Palestinian solidarity. The immediate response was, to be honest, deeply inadequate and largely self-centered. Believing itself to be the sole remaining mass organization within the Italian political and social left, the CGIL assumed it held a kind of decisive role in any mass mobilization. It therefore organized its own initiatives, effectively in competition with the emerging movement. This was the case with the rallies and demonstrations on Saturday, September 6, which in practice served as alternatives to the September 4 and 7 events promoted by the Italian supporters of the Flotilla; and again, on September 19, when a hastily called general strike was announced only days before the September 22 strike—ironically excluding the most active sectors in the movement (education, universities, and research). The results were disastrous, both on the 6th and the 19th. While the rallies and marches organized within the Flotilla network drew large and dynamic crowds (for instance, tens of thousands in Rome on Sunday, September 7, and several thousand more the following day at an impromptu rally outside La Sapienza University after the first attack on Tunis), the CGIL’s own events attracted only a few hundred participants (mostly staff, officials, and activists from within the organization). The September 19 strike saw crowds of only a few thousand in cities like Bologna, Mestre, Florence, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Rome, and Catania—aside from a few more successful cases, such as the march and port blockade in Livorno. The misstep was so obvious that the organization itself immediately recognized it, far beyond the ranks of my alternative current in the union. The network of shop-stewards and activists within universities, schools, and research institutions had already warned of this the previous week and ultimately directed participation toward the September 22 strike (in some cities, like Milan, even bringing local structures and union representatives to the streets alongside students). The massive turnout on September 22 swept away any remaining hesitation or resistance: popular participation pulled along organizations, associations, institutions, and unions alike. The CGIL then demonstrated its ability to pivot, starting with a recognition of the movement’s pathways and initiatives. The confederation joined, in effect, a coordination with the other actors, leading to the unprecedented joint press conference of the Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF), CGIL (Landini), USB (Lutrario), CUB (Amoroso), and Cobas (Miliucci). It broke, in a sense, a long-standing taboo. This shift produced the joint demonstrations after the attack on the Flotilla, the joint strike of October 3, and even the October 4 march—despite reservations about certain aspects of the strike platform (and, I must admit, some personal doubts about the last-minute inclusion of the CGIL in the march). The enormous popular participation dispelled all hesitation and fear. Still, the lingering concern is that—despite this positive turn—the shift has not yet been deeply reflected upon or fully internalized within the organization, starting with an acknowledgment of the September missteps and the necessity of being part of a broader collective movement.
8. The Determination of the Mobilizations. The general strike found broad consensus and support because, in the face of the gravity of the situation in Gaza, popular indignation felt the need for actions capable of having a tangible impact within the country. The call to “block everything” echoed the bloquons tout slogan of the French mobilizations against Bayrou’s proposed austerity budget (he later resigned). It was, in other words, the outward expression of a desire to mark a rupture in the face of genocide and the attack on an international humanitarian mission. The demonstrations of September 22 and October 3 thus featured mass practices aimed at effectively bringing the country to a standstill. In the context of a modern, interconnected society, the general demand to “block everything” materialized in the objective of blocking ring roads, highways, streets, railway tracks, and stations. The actions were carried out mostly through mass participation, beyond any vanguardist logic, following the example of the metalworkers’ strike in Bologna the previous June (when ten thousand workers, including FIM-CISL and its national secretary, blocked the city’s ring road). Despite the security decree approved in the spring — which increased the number of offenses and stiffened penalties for demonstrations (unauthorized gatherings, road blockages, building occupations, service interruptions) — tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people, joined in blocking roads and infrastructures together, demonstrating that it is precisely mass dynamics that can break prohibitions and authoritarian impositions. The practice of blockades was not limited to major cities (Rome, Milan, Bologna, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Naples) but spread to medium and small towns as well (including Bergamo, Brescia, Massa, Vicenza and Thiene, Treviso, and Pisa). Although there were sporadic episodes of repression (charges, arrests, and indictments), in substance the so-called law enforcement agencies mostly stood back, showing once again that mass participation can effectively defy the rules.
9. The Bending of the Strike Regulations. The call by CGIL, USB, CUB–SGB, Cobas, and others for a general strike after the attack on the Flotilla was issued in less than twenty-four hours, even though the regulations stemming from Law No. 146 of 1990 generally require a ten-day notice period. The unions invoked the now well-known Article 2, paragraph 7 of the same law, which allows exceptions to the minimum notice period and to the indication of strike duration in cases of work stoppages in defense of the constitutional order, or as a protest against serious events endangering workers’ safety and physical integrity. As expected — and as it had already done regarding previous proclamations by USB and SiCobas — the Strike Regulation Commission did not accept this justification. Nonetheless, the unions maintained the strike call. Much rhetoric has been spent on this act of defiance, but the reality is somewhat different and worth examining carefully. Politically, I consider it significant that the CGIL finally challenged Law No. 146 of 1990 and opposed the prescriptions of the National Guarantee Commission. First, because I believe this is the first time CGIL has not followed the Commission’s indications, thereby opening a critical reflection on a regulatory framework to which it largely contributed in another historical period. Second — and this is no minor point — in some sectors of CGIL there have recently emerged reflections on new possible forms of strike action, though paradoxically starting from a reaffirmation of that very same law. Thus, while I do not underestimate the importance of what happened, nor the need for a continued and deepened critical reflection on anti-strike legislation, it also seems important to recognize that on October 3 the bending of the regulations fortunately fell entirely upon the unions themselves (in the form of fines and sanctions). Workers in most sectors, in fact, were able to rely on coverage provided by another general strike, called within the proper time frame and on convergent grounds by SiCobas. Otherwise, the breach could have had significant consequences for some participants (in education and research, for instance, even a simple warning letter could have posed problems for precarious staff). Therefore, October 3 was important not only for achieving full convergence among different unions but also for ensuring full protection for all those taking part in the strike — particularly in the education sectors. This outcome did not come about by chance, but also because SiCobas stood firm in maintaining its proclamation despite the Commission’s objections (especially in the education sector), and because there were actors who interacted with SiCobas and, in their own way, contributed to making that strike possible.
10. A Fluid, Multiple, and Moleculary Self-Organized Movement. The mobilizations of recent weeks have taken the form of a tide, recalling the mass experiences of Non Una di Meno, the reaction against femicides, and the Pride marches. All this has been inspiring precisely because it managed to give the initiatives a mass dimension. It could break through the boundaries and confinements of the various organizations and subjectivities. The tide, in other words, has swept over unions, parties, and associations, large and small alike, bringing them all back to the condition of being part of a part — subjectivities internal to a broader movement. The long phase of regression and disorganization of the workers’ movement, in fact, has left these organized subjectivities unaccustomed to interacting with the broader collective belonging of the working class. In the tides of September 22, October 3, and October 4, everyone rediscovered a mass dimension — precious and indispensable for any perspective one might wish to build. Yet this tide also reveals its limits: precisely because it has expressed itself more as a tide than as a mass political movement. This great molecular self-organization, this fluidity and horizontality of participation, is reflected in the near-total absence of democratic spaces for discussion and decision-making (assemblies, delegates, committees, and councils). To be fair, the Italian experience has always been somewhat reluctant in this regard, because it was influenced both by Stalinist and operaism traditions (unlike, for instance, the Spanish or French movements). It also manifests in the lack of moments or structures of coordination among the different actors (inter-union bodies, intergroup networks, citywide assemblies). Everything is chaotic, alive: diverse approaches and perspectives coexist like many currents within a common sea. This was crucial to the success of October 3 and 4, when different claims around Palestine and resistance — often quite distinct from one another — managed to coexist, without any single one asserting hegemony over the mobilization. At the same time, however, what is missing today is the possibility to engage in confrontation, discussion, and debate — to oppose but also to develop the various approaches and perspectives. There is also a lack of capacity to structure this movement across territories and articulate it within different social realities, formulating specific actions and interventions for each context. In short, what is missing for now is the movement’s ability to collectively gain experience, mature, evolve, and direct itself. Thus, the tide risks passing like a wave — quickly rising, then fading away.
11. A Confined Tide. It is useful to recognize another important limitation of this movement: its boundaries. As we have noted, participation in the demonstrations of recent weeks has been extraordinary — both in intensity and in scope. For years, and in some places for decades, we had not seen squares so full. In certain small towns and villages, some even said they had never seen marches or initiatives so widely attended. This was a sign of how capillary this wave of demonstrations has been, thanks in large part to the significant participation of students and very young people who mobilized starting from their own schools. However, not all sectors of society were activated with the same intensity. We have already emphasized how the keystone of this movement was the form of the general strike, the direct involvement of workers. Yet not all segments of working class were engaged in this mobilization. While the strike proposal originated from a specific and central sector of the working class (the dockworkers), it is also important to acknowledge that not the entire organized working class participated with the same intensity. Certainly, some historic factories — unionized and politically active — responded to the call and took part in demonstrations across different cities. But my impression, observing those marches and rallies, is that there was a lack of a truly organized and mass presence of workers from the metalworking, chemical, and food industries. There were union leaders, delegates, and activists in the streets — many with their families — but I did not see participation structured by workplace, factory, company, plant, or office. I emphasize this because I think it is important to keep two things in mind. First, there is the risk that in the coming weeks and months a fault line may emerge — and then widen — between those who were in the streets and those who were not; between those who have experienced and still feel indignation over the Palestinian question, and those who remain absorbed in their daily hardship; between a younger generation entering political participation and a left still anchored to the organizational forms of a previous era. Preventing this fault line from becoming a fracture is the responsibility of all the subjectivities moving within this movement. Second, precisely because it still takes the form of a tide, and precisely because it remains confined, this movement has not yet had a direct impact on the social relations of this country, nor therefore on its political framework. These weeks have not shifted the balance of forces between the classes of this country, nor altered the disorganization of the working class, nor reduced the pressure of international competition on wages, working hours, and labor organization. For now, these weeks have only torn open a glimpse — revealing the potential of a mass movement. Prime Minister Meloni and her reactionary government thus retain their support within Italian society and at the polls (as has recently been seen in Valle d’Aosta, the Marche, and Calabria). Of course, this support is not a majority one, but it remains significant. It can shape common sense in the face of a parliamentary opposition that is essentially liberal and a working class that is deeply fragmented.
12. And Now? As Music for Peace reminded us, in these past weeks we have witnessed an extraordinary surge of unity. It was expressed not only within union bodies and assemblies, but also with people’s feet and minds, through their participation in marches and strikes. A breaking down of boundaries and affiliations that I cannot recall seeing in other moments of intense social mobilization. The question now is: how much of this participation, self-organization, and determination will remain and develop in the coming autumn? In recent days, we have already sensed a decline in tension, partly due to the confusion and uncertainty of a complicated truce — brokered, unexpectedly, by actors like Trump and the United States. Translating this energy into resistance against the rearmament, war, and austerity policies that the Meloni government is confirming in its budget law seems straightforward. Actually, it is only in the minds and hearts of that broad left-wing vanguard we referred to at the beginning of this reflection. For most of those who took part in the movement, however, such a transition is far from guaranteed; it will require time, experience, and maturation. However, they might not even have the chance to fully develop, given the forms and dynamics through which these mobilizations have expressed themselves. Some may therefore be tempted to accelerate this process by escalating the confrontation, taking vanguard leaps forward. Others may instead feel the urge to tighten their organizational networks before this wave of mobilization ebbs away completely. I believe, on the contrary, that this tide should be allowed to express itself: patiently and resolutely nurturing its blossoming, seeking to bridge the gaps and lines of fracture. In November there will be strikes and initiatives against the government’s policies. It would be valuable if the CGIL could once again feel itself part of a part — overcoming the mourning for its possible break with the UIL and outlining an open path toward a general strike. In other words, it would be useful to avoid retreating into its own agenda, as risks happening with the October 25 demonstration, which appears, in its themes and forms, largely detached from the events of recent weeks. It would also be useful if the militant and grassroots unionism — both USB and the other organizations — recognized the importance of cultivating the movement’s growth, avoiding the mere repetition of organizational or factional initiatives. Perhaps by attempting to weave together the paths of the general strike with those of the student mobilizations, starting with the next day of action on November 14. We should move with a sense of urgency toward convergence. As a recent statement from Radici del Sindacato nella FLC CGIL reminds us: Today is the time for conflict. Today is the time for convergence.
Today is the time to take a step back, to feel oneself part of a movement capable of growing and building a mass social opposition to this reactionary government.
